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Abstract
All companies, regardless of the sector they belong to, can positively or negatively 
impact human rights. Governments are increasingly aware of the benefits that 
free trade brings their nations, which has led them to do whatever is necessary 
to attract foreign investment, even if it means to act against the interests of their 
own people. The power relationship between corporations and states generates 
a tension derived from their nature: while the objective of states is the welfare of 
its members, the purpose of corporations is profit. It is in the crack generated by 
the collision of powers and purposes between these two actors, that this article 
is intended to raise the discussion on the need to establish an international 
framework for corporate liability for human rights violations. To achieve its goal, 
the article will analyze the opportunities and obstacles raised by the exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in the American context and its relationship with the 
developments in the business and human rights field.
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¿Es necesario el marco de responsabilidad  
de los Derechos Humanos Corporativos Internacionales?  
Un análisis del poder económico, los derechos comerciales y humanos  
y la jurisdicción extraterritorial de los Estados Unidos
Resumen
Todas las empresas, sin importar el sector al que pertenezcan, pueden tener un 
efecto positivo o negativo en los derechos humanos. Los gobiernos están cada 
vez más conscientes de los beneficios que implica el libre comercio para sus 
naciones, y esto los ha llevado a realizar lo necesario para atraer la inversión 
extranjera, incluso si se tiene que actuar contra los intereses de sus propias 
poblaciones.  La relación de poder entre las empresas y los estados genera una 
tensión que surge de su propia naturaleza: mientras el objetivo de los estados 
es el bienestar de sus miembros, el propósito de las empresas son las utilidades. 
Debido a la grieta producida por el choque de poderes y los propósitos existentes 
entre estos dos actores es que este artículo pretende generar la discusión sobre la 
necesidad de establecer un marco internacional para responsabilidad corporativa 
para las violaciones de los derechos humanos. Para lograr este objetivo, el artículo 
analizará las oportunidades y los obstáculos que surgen con el ejercicio de la 
jurisdicción extraterritorial en el contexto de los Estados Unidos y su relación con 
los desarrollos en el campo de los derechos comerciales y humanos. 
Palabras clave: Derechos comerciales y humanos; responsabilidad corporativa; in-
versión extranjera directa; jurisdicción extraterritorial; Ley de Reclamación por 
Agravios contra Extranjeros (ATCA, por su sigla en inglés)
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Introduction
It could be arguable, that the human rights 
international regime is designed to make Sta-
tes the sole bearer of responsibility for human 
rights promotion and protection. After all, what 
is the reason of existence of States if not to 
guarantee the welfare of its members? As clear 
as that argument seems to be, assuming it as 
an absolute statement has the consequence of 
appearing highly questionable the reasons why 
corporations could or should be responsible for 
human rights violations. How do they enter the 
picture and for which reasons should they do so?
Trying to approach those questions from a 
normative perspective, Professor Louis Henkin 
resorted to the preamble of the Universal De-
claration of Human Rights, which establishes 
that “every individual and every organ of society, 
(…) shall strive by teaching and education to 
promote respect for these rights and freedoms 
(the ones enshrined in the Declaration)” (Human 
Rights Comission, 1984, Preamble).  In his keyno-
te address at Brooklyn Law School on November 
5, 1998, Professor Henkin emphasized that re-
garding human rights, “Every individual includes 
juridical persons. Every individual and every organ 
of society excludes no one, no company, no mar-
ket, no cyberspace. The Universal Declaration 
applies to them all” (Henkin, 1999, p. 25).
The purpose of this article is to present a diffe-
rent approach to the normative interpretation 
given by Professor Henkin; that is, an approach 
based on politics, economics and judicial ar-
guments to address the main questions listed 
above. With that in mind, this article is divided 
into three chapters with independent, but at 
the same time inter-related approaches, giving 
space to interdisciplinary considerations.
In the first chapter under the title Corporations as 
relevant actors in the human rights regimes: A matter 
of power, I aim to establish that a product of glo-
balization is the world giving greater relevance 
to markets than to states. Society has given 
enough strength to corporations, as tenants of 
the economic power, to have a direct impact on 
individual human rights. As a consequence of 
this new reality, the need for the development 
of a human rights framework for corporate res-
ponsibility arises. 
Under the title: A too friendly ‘investment friendly’ 
state? – Foreign Direct Investment and corporate human 
rights responsibility in the second section of this 
article, I will present how the intention of a state 
to open their economy to foreign investment 
–although being a positive thing, can result in 
the negative relaxation of its public policies, 
jeopardizing the obligation of states to guaran-
tee the full exercise of rights of its citizens. In 
this chapter I will also address how the modern 
structure of corporations, that is, increasingly 
transnational and complex, may be used as a 
mechanism for avoiding national or international 
responsibility.
Finally, the third chapter is entitled ‘The exercise 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction: solution and obstacle to 
the responsibility of corporations’. In this chapter I 
use the American domestic jurisdiction as an 
example of how through a separation between 
parent corporations and their subsidiaries, 
Transnational Corporations (TNCs) have gone 
to exceptional lengths to deny national tribu-
nals competence to acknowledge human rights 
violations committed abroad. 
Corporations as relevant actors in the human rights 
regimes: a matter of power
In today’s world, the power relationship between 
states and corporations has shifted as a conse-
quence of a market-centralized society and the 
increasing economic power of corporations. In 
this chapter I will present the risks that this new 
reality represents for human rights protection 
due to states commonly finding themselves in 
difficult positions of inferior economic power. 
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This in turn obliges them to negotiate their sen-
sitive public policies with powerful corporations.
1. A new corporate-inclusive world scenario
It would be possible to achieve human rights 
protection solely through obligations upon 
governments if they were considered to be the 
only source of threats to human dignity or if they 
were powerful enough to effectively restrain any 
wrongful conduct against fundamental rights 
within their territory (Ratner, 2011). However, 
the reality of the situation is different. Today’s 
globalized world, nurtured by expedited means 
of communication, involves the interaction of a 
number of additional powerful actors such as 
corporations, upon which some “[s]tates lack the 
resources or will to exercise an effective control, 
[and] others may even go as far as soliciting 
corporations to cooperate in impinging human 
rights” (Ratner, 2011, p. 461) 
In fact, following Susan Strange’s proposal for 
a new conceptualization of politics and power, 
I am of the same opinion that the integration 
of the world economy, pushed by multinational 
corporations, has shifted the balance of powers 
away from states and towards global markets 
(Strange, 1996). It is mandatory to include 
economic power considerations in this reality, 
which moves away from focusing exclusively on 
political power when answering the question: 
who controls the world economy? The fact 
that economic power resides in corporations, 
in particular in transnational corporations, 
demonstrate the great influence that they can 
have over individuals and their rights, because 
in the end:  “markets matter more than states” 
(Ratner, 2011 p. 462) in today’s society.
Examples of how the shifting power balance 
may affect individuals and their rights will be 
discussed in this article as numerous cases of 
human rights violations committed by corpora-
tions are analyzed.
Acknowledging the fact that states have the pri-
mary responsibility for the protection of human 
rights, the power that companies accumulate, 
both nationally and internationally, makes it im-
possible to ignore their relevance and influence 
in relation to human rights. Corporations have 
enough strength to violate, put at risk, or con-
tribute in the violation of human rights before 
the eyes of a perplexed State that is unable or 
unwilling to avoid it. “Today we (…) live in a glo-
bal world, wherein a variety of actors for which 
the territorial state is not the cardinal organizing 
principle, have come to play significant public 
roles” (Ruggie, 2006, p. 10). 
2. Examples providing evidence for corporations’ 
economic power versus states economic 
weakness
Following the reasoning above, I will now de-
monstrate that corporations’ economic power, 
in particular that of transnational corporations, 
is often bigger than the countries that they are 
dealing with. This creates an unfair playing field 
(Stiglitz, 2007-2008). The analysis of states’ so-
cio-economic status will be based on statistical 
data provided by the World Bank (World Bank, 
2012, 9 of July). In regards to private enterprises I 
will rely on information published by Forbes Ma-
gazine (Forbes Magazine, 2012, 18 of April). After 
comparing the 2011 revenues of the companies 
with the 2011 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 
192 countries1, some interesting findings were 
obtained:
– The annual sales of Royal Dutch Shell (USD$ 
470.2 billions) are higher than the GDPs of 
168 countries, out of the 192 analyzed. This 
means that if Shell was a state, it will occu-
py the 25th position in the World Bank GDP 
Ranking.
1 GDP is defined as: A measure of the value of the total pro-
duction in a country, usually in a given year Fairlex Inc. (2012). 
Fairlex Financial Dictionary. Website: http://financial-dictionary.
thefreedictionary.com/GDP (Last visited Sep. 7, 2012).
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– Out of the 10 companies in the world with 
the highest revenues, six of them are in the 
oil and gas industries, demonstrating why 
this is such a relevant sector for the human 
rights discussion. 
– When put together the revenues of the top 
10 corporations with the highest sales in the 
world (USD$ 3.345.30 billion) they are higher 
than the GDPs of all the countries in the 
world except for four. Moreover, of these ten 
corporations, only 2 (Shell from the Nether-
lands and BP from the United Kingdom) are 
not one of the four countries with the highest 
GDPs.
– Out of the One hundred largest companies 
in the world (not only considering sales, but 
profit, assets and market value), 31 from the 
United States, 25 are from the European 
Union2, and 17 from BRIC3 countries4.
– Out of the list of the 100 companies with the 
highest sales, 35 are from the United States, 
335 from the European Union, and 14 from 
BRIC countries6.
The statistics shown, far from making any kind 
of accusation against TNCs in general, aim to 
demonstrate the circumstances that exist for 
corporations to wield their economic power 
against states; creating an uneven playing field in 
order to gain special tax or regulatory treatment 
from them  (Stiglitz, 2007-2008).
Because of this unbalanced relationship, sta-
tes may feel pressured to favor the interests of 
2 France (7); Germany (7); United Kingdom (5); Italy (2); Spain (3); 
Netherlands (2) and Belgium (1).
3 The term BRICs or BRIC countries is an acronym for Brazil, Rus-
sia, India and China. Goldman Sachs Head of Global Economic 
Research Jim O’Neill first used the term in a 2001, see O’Neil, J. 
(2001, 30 November).  Building Better Global Economic BRICs’. 
Global Economic Paper, (No. 66), Goldman Sachs. Available at: http://
www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/building-better-doc.pdf 
(Consulted until May 2, 2010).
4 China (8); Brazil (5) and Russia (4).
5 Germany (11); France (8); United Kingdom (4); Italy (4); Spain (3); 
Netherlands (2); and Luxemburg (1).
6 China (7); Brazil (5) and Russia (2).
TNCs, even if, by doing so, they act against the 
welfare of their population. Where a government 
is too weak to comply with its public mandate, it 
could reach such a degree that the necessity for 
the international community to react in defense 
of the human rights of the citizens of that state 
becomes warranted. Of course, developing a 
useful and objective criterion for determining 
what would be considered ‘such a degree’ is a 
difficult task. 
The negotiation and application of those stan-
dards by states will represent an even greater 
challenge. The establishment of clear standards 
of corporate responsibility becomes an interna-
tional necessity. 
3. A too friendly ‘investment friendly’ state?  
Foreign Direct Investment and corporate human 
rights responsibility.
As previously stated, the imbalance in econo-
mic power between states and corporations 
is sufficient justification to make the activities 
of corporations in developing countries an in-
ternational concern, where those activities are 
directed against particularly vulnerable parts of 
the population. 
In today’s free-trade based markets most of the 
commerce that takes place within a country is 
conducted by foreign corporations, or corpora-
tions with assets in multiple countries (Stiglitz, 
2007-2008, p. 453). There is no large or medium-
size company that is established in one country 
that does not have a plan to expand its business 
to other territories in the pursuit of better and 
more profitable markets.
Generally, the increasing activities around the 
world of TNCs have also brought enormous 
benefits to developing countries. A particularly 
noteworthy benefit for example, is the closing 
of the knowledge gap between developing and 
developed nations. According to Nobel Prize 
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laureate Joseph Stiglitz, this factor is even more 
important for the welfare of a country than 
the resources gap. Indeed, “[m]ore important 
than the capital that [multinational corpora-
tions] bring, are the transfer of technology, the 
training of human resources, and the access 
to international markets” (Stiglitz, 2007-2008, 
p. 453). 
All of these benefits have led to an increasing 
desire by developing countries to attract fore-
ign investment since the 1970s. The desire of 
developing nations to present themselves as 
‘investment friendly’ countries requires that they 
concede to normative and public policy conces-
sions; resulting in negative consequences which 
are not foreseen at the time they were given. 
Moreover, even if these negative consequences 
were foreseen, developing countries would not 
have the power to bargain a different outcome 
(Vázquez, 2005). “[a]s a result, countries often 
find that they have assumed obligations which, 
further down the road, will place limitations on 
their own development programs. The normative 
challenge, for its part, calls for a refinement of 
[foreign investment] policy and its alignment 
with the countries’ larger development plans” 
(Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean -ECLAC-, 2001, p. 15).
Caused by the same phenomena built on the 
dogma: ‘[Foreign Direct Investment]: the more 
the better’, (Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean -ECLAC-, 2001, p. 15) 
countries widely open themselves to investors 
without having the adequate mechanisms to 
monitor corporation’s activities both internally, 
in their relationship with their own workers, and 
externally in the impact that it may have on the 
wider community, such as environmental issues 
or the impact on vulnerable communities (Rat-
ner, 2011, p. 462).
Professor Stiglitz gives a powerful example of 
the problems arising as a consequence of the 
wrongful behavior of TNCs: 
In some cases [T]NCs take a country’s 
natural resources, paying but a pittance 
while leaving behind an environmental 
disaster. When called upon by the go-
vernment to clean up the mess, the [T]
NC announces that it is bankrupt: All of 
the revenues have already been paid out 
to shareholders. In these circumstances, 
[T]NCs are taking advantage of limited 
liability. In some cases, when the adverse 
consequences of their actions are criti-
cized, [T]NCs plead that they are simply 
following the law; but such defenses are 
disingenuous for they often work hard to 
make sure that the law suits them well 
(Stiglitz, 2007-2008, p. 474).
As a result of the described situations an inter-
national concept for corporate responsibility 
needs to be developed.  Such a concept should 
include intelligible human rights standards for 
corporations and states concerning the effects 
of TNC’s behavior; that will include enforcement 
and accountability measures, as well as effecti-
ve access to remedies for victims of corporate 
misconduct. 
4. The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction: 
the obstacle and the solution to corporate 
responsibility
In compliance with his 2005 mandate, the Spe-
cial Representative of the Secretary-General 
on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises 
SRSG, held four workshops during 2006 that 
included academic experts, legal practitioners 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
representatives from different regions. Two of 
the workshops, one held in New York and the 
other in Brussels, were concerned with corpo-
rate responsibility under international law and 
on extraterritorial jurisdiction. The summaries 
of the workshop’s discussions were compiled 
in the SRSG 2nd Addendum to the 2007 Report 
to the Unite Nations Human Rights Council 
(Ruggie, 2007).
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Participants of the workshop “focused the dis-
cussion mainly on the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction by a home State over the overseas 
activities of TNCs with some link to that Sta-
te” (Ruggie, 2007, p. 41). There was a general 
agreement upon the fact that “some link to the 
State” should refer to the bond of the TNC with 
a particular State based on its nationality. An 
exemption to this rule is the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction by a State, defined as a jurisdiction 
that could “be invoked for a limited number of 
international crimes (crimes against humanity, 
genocide, war crimes, torture, forced disappea-
rances)” (Ruggie, 2007, p. 42).
Following the reasoning of the SRSG workshop, 
I will focus the discussion on the exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, particularly in the 
United States, for both substantial and practical 
reasons. First, from a substantial perspective, 
the United States’ legal system has served as the 
forum where some of the most complex issues 
regarding the accountability of foreign corpora-
tions have been addressed. Legal frameworks 
such as the Aliens Claims Tort Act and the 
Torture Victim Protection Act have encouraged 
the proliferation of cases against foreign com-
panies or domestic companies that committed 
human rights violations abroad. Secondly, from 
a practical perspective, most if not all of the 
biggest corporations in the world have some 
‘presence’ in the United States, which makes 
them susceptible to liability under American 
laws (Joseph, 2004, p. 87).  
Today, globalized corporations operate world-
wide using the form of “multinational corpora-
te groups” organized in “incredibly complex” 
multi-tiered corporate structures consisting of 
a dominant parent corporation, sub-holding 
companies, and scores or hundreds of subser-
vient subsidiaries scattered around the world” 
(Blumberg, 2002, p. 493). “Ordinarily, the ulti-
mate ‘parent’ of the group is a publicly traded 
company” (Born & Rutledge, 2007, p. 164).
Using its ‘complex structure’, the company may 
try to avoid having direct contact with the US by 
performing all its acts through its subsidiaries, 
agents or distributors. In doing so, “the fore-
ign company is not subject to US jurisdiction, 
because it lacks its own minimum contacts7 
with the relevant US forum” (Born & Rutledge, 
2007, p. 165). In Berkey v. Third Aveneu Railway Co., 
Justice Cardozo held that “[t]he whole problem 
of the relation between parent and subsidiary 
corporations is one that is still enveloped in 
the mists of metaphors. Metaphors in law are 
to be narrowly watched, for starting at devices 
to liberate through, they end often enslaving 
it” (Berkey v. Third Aveneu Railway Co. 1926, 
p. 94) Justice Cardozo’s finding is still relevant, 
specially if we acknowledge the non-existent 
agreement in the issue of the parent-subsidiary 
corporation’s relationship.
Under an intricate parent-subsidiary relations-
hip, plaintiffs for human rights abuses commit-
ted by TNCs face two main procedural obstacles 
in US courts: first for the court to be able to 
exercise jurisdiction they need to establish 
‘personal jurisdiction’ and secondly, there is the 
7 For understanding the ‘Minimum contacts’ formula, see Born & 
Rutledge (2007, p. 80-81). International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310 (Supreme Court of the United States 3 of Decem-
ber of 1945): “Due Process requires that in order to subject a 
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within 
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts 
with it, “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ ”. Most 
recently Juelich v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics Corp., 682 NW2d 565 
(Supreme Court of Minnesota 24 of June of 2004):  “A five-fac-
tor test determines whether jurisdiction is consistent with due 
process: (1) the quantity of contacts with the forum state; (2) 
the nature and quality of those contacts; (3) the connection of 
the cause of action with these contacts; (4) the interest of the 
forum state; and (5) the convenience of the parties.”  Also see 
CFA Institute v. Institute of Chartered Financial Analyst of India, 551 
F3d 285 (United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit 9 of 
January of 2009); Group Ltd. v. Washington Regional Medical Center, 
536 F3d 757 (United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit 
5 of August of 2008); Anderson v. Dassault Aviation, 361 F3d 449 
(United States Court of Appeals 4 of March of 2004); Marshall 
v. Inn On Madeline Island, 610 NW2d. 670 (Court of Appeals of 
Minnesota 9 of May of 2000); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia 
SA v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (Supreme Court of the United States 
24 of April of 1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 
U.S. 286 (Supreme Court of the United States 21 of January of 
1980). 
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risk that US Courts may deny the claim under 
the jurisdictional ground of forum non convenience 
(Joseph, 2004, p. 28).
4.1. Personal Jurisdiction
In order to establish the liability of a parent com-
pany, the requisite personal jurisdiction must be 
proven, that is, that the parent corporation was 
acting in the host state through a subsidiary, 
agent or distributor (Joseph, 2004, p. 84)8.
In this regard, the case law is inconsistent, 
allowing in some cases foreign companies to 
isolate themselves from the jurisdiction of US 
courts by using an agent, subsidiary, distributor 
or any other business partner, and disregarding 
it in others. In Lister v. Marangoni Mecanica 
SpA. (1990), for example, a Utah District Court 
upheld personal jurisdiction where products 
were marketed through a distributor who agreed 
to distribute them in host states. On the other 
hand, in Maschinenfabrik Seydelmann v. Altman. 
(1985), a District Court of Appeal of Florida 
denied personal jurisdiction where a German 
defendant appointed an exclusive US distributor 
that over a 22-year period sold 23 machines with 
a total value of USD$1 million (Born & Rutledge, 
2007, p. 147).
Trying to prevent inconsistencies as presented 
above, US Courts base their decisions on two 
criteria. “First, US courts have asserted juris-
diction when a domestic company is merely 
the “alter ego” of a foreign parent. Second, 
jurisdiction may be exercised where a domestic 
subsidiary is the “agent” of its foreign parent” 
(Born & Rutledge, 2007, p. 165).
8 See also ATCA Cases: Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman 
Energy (United Stated District Court of the Southern District of 
New York 19 of March of 2003); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
(United States Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit 14 of 
September of 2000); Doe v. Unocal, 27 F.Supp2d. 1174 (United 
States District Court, C.D. California 25 of March of 1997).
a) The ‘alter ego’ doctrine
According to this doctrine, personal jurisdiction 
is given when “a parent and its subsidiary fail to 
comply with the formal requirements of corpora-
te separateness, or when a parent exercises an 
extreme level of control over its subsidiary, so 
that they cannot be regarded as ‘really separate 
entities” (Joseph, 2004, p. 84). 
In Doe v. Unocal (2001, p. 926), the U.S. Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals laid out the require-
ments that a plaintiff has to establish in order 
for the court to apply the alter ego doctrine:
… to demonstrate that the parent and 
subsidiary are “not really separate enti-
ties” and satisfy the alter ego exception 
to the general rule that a subsidiary and 
the parent are separate entities, the 
plaintiff must make out a prima facie 
case “(1) that there is such unity of in-
terest and ownership that the separate 
personalities [of the two entities] no lon-
ger exist and (2) that failure to disregard 
[their separate identities] would result in 
fraud or injustice (American Telephone 
& Telegraph Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles 
Lambert, 1996, p. 591).
At the end, the aim of the alter ego test is to 
show that the parent corporation controls the 
subsidiary “to such a degree as to render the 
latter the mere instrumentality of the former” 
(Calvert v. Huckins, 1995, p. 678). 
But although the criteria needed for the ful-
fillment of the alter ego test have been set out 
clearly in the decision above, they remain very 
difficultly to satisfy as they need to be esta-
blished in an “extremely fact-intensive” process 
(Blumberg, 2002, p. 498). For example, in the 
Unocal Case, the District Court found that “the 
level of control was not however so extreme as 
to establish ‘alter-ego’ status” (Joseph, 2004, 
p. 85). For the foreign parent corporation it is 
therefore desirable to hide its links with its U.S. 
based subsidiary. On the other hand, on behalf 
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of the plaintiff it will of course, require great 
amounts of human and pecuniary resources 
allocated to legal research to demonstrate a lack 
of separateness between the two companies.
Another difficulty that arises in the application 
of the alter ego test is being able to determine 
when the parent company’s control is carried 
out to an extreme, specially regarding activities 
that may involve human rights violations and 
the framework developed by the SRSG that 
involves a “corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights” (Ruggie, 2008)9, with a strong 
need for due diligence on behalf of the parent 
corporation.
b) Alter-ego v. human rights due diligence
The business and human rights framework 
of the UN presented in 2008 by the SRSG, is 
based on three pillars: the duty of the state to 
protect against human rights abuses by third 
parties, including by businesses; the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights; and the 
need for greater access by victims to effective 
remedies in judicial and non-judicial form (Ru-
ggie, 2008, p. 9).  
The category of corporate responsibility has 
due diligence as one of its key elements which is 
defined as the “appropriate corporate response 
to managing the risks of infringing the rights of 
others” (Ruggie, 2010, p. 79). It consists of a set 
of steps that a “company must take to become 
aware of, prevent and address adverse human 
rights impact” (Ruggie, 2008, p. 57).
9 See also: J. Ruggie. (2009, 22 of April). Business and Human 
Rights: Towards operationalizing the “protect, respect and rem-
edy” framework. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises, (pp. 13-20), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/13; 
J. Ruggie. (2010, 9 of April). Business and Human Rights: Further 
steps towards operationalizing the “protect, respect and rem-
edy” framework. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises, (pp. 12-18), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27.
The following four due diligence components 
were integrated by the SRSG into the report in 
respect of human rights: 1) A statement of po-
licy articulating the company’s commitment to 
respecting human rights; 2) Periodic assessment 
of the actual and potential human rights impacts 
of the corporation’s activities and relations-
hips; 3) Integrating these commitments and 
assessments into internal control and oversight 
systems; and 4) Tracking and reporting perfor-
mance  (Ruggie, 2010, p. 83).
If performed by the parent corporation towards 
a subsidiary, the due diligence components 
could be understood as satisfying the ‘extreme 
control’ requirement of the alter-ego test. Yet, 
parent corporations could argue that they are 
exercising a very close control of their subsidiary 
not because the latter is a mere legal instru-
ment of the former, but because they have to 
comply with their human rights due diligence 
responsibilities. 
Such an argumentation could render the alter-
ego test inapplicable. On the contrary, TNCs 
could argue that they cannot comply with their 
human rights due diligence responsibilities, 
because by doing so the parent corporation will 
exercise extreme control over their subsidiaries, 
making them liable for their wrong doing. This 
position will turn the alter-ego doctrine into an 
excuse for non-compliance with due diligence 
responsibilities.
c) The ‘Agency’ doctrine
An alternative way to establish jurisdiction over 
a foreign corporation could be by determining 
the existence of an ‘agency’ relationship bet-
ween the foreign parent company and its US 
subsidiary. Agency is defined in common law as 
“[…] the fiduciary relationship that arises when 
one person (a “principal”) manifests assent to 
another person (an “agent”) that the agent shall 
act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the 
principal’s control, and the agent manifests as-
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sent or otherwise consents so to act” (American 
Law Institute, 2006). 
Following this definition and its development 
through US courts (although similarly inconsis-
tent as it is regarding the alter-ego doctrine), one 
may come to the conclusion that a relationship 
of agency exists if the following requirements 
are satisfied:  a) The alleged agent must have 
acted for the benefit of the alleged principal; 
b) The principal must have knowledge of, and 
must have consented to, the agent’s actions on 
its behalf; and c) The principal must have had 
sufficient control over the agent’s actions (Cutco 
Industries, Inc. v. Naughton, 1986)10.
In the Second and Ninth Circuits, a new doctrine 
on agency was developed in the Unocal and Wiwa 
cases. According to these cases, “an entity is a 
corporation’s agent if it performs services that 
are ‘sufficiently important to the [parent] that if 
it did not have a representative to perform them, 
the [parent’s] own official would undertake to 
perform substantially similar services” (Joseph, 
2004, p. 85).
However, with regard to the agency standard, 
certain difficulties in establishing jurisdiction 
in U.S. courts arise. First, the case law on the 
applicability of the agency test is so heteroge-
neous that “some courts have abandoned any 
attempt at articulating a test, opting instead for 
a ‘totality of the circumstances’ approach” (Born 
& Rutledge, 2007, p. 180).
Secondly, an even more obvious complication 
is that “[c]ommon law agency has not arisen as 
a basis for jurisdiction over parent corporations 
in respect of the actions of their subsidiaries in 
transnational human rights litigation” (Joseph, 
10 See also Grove Press, Inc. v. Angleton, 649 F.2d 121 (United States 
Court of Appeal Second Circuit 12 of May of 1981) at p. 122; Plaza 
Realty Investors v. Bailey, 484 F.Supp. 335 (United States District 
Court Southern District of New York 14 of December of 1979) 
at p. 347; Louis Marx & Co. v. Fuji Seiko Co., Ltd., 453 F.Supp. 385 
(United States District Court Southern District of New York 30 
of May of 1978) at p. 390.
2004, p. 85). Because of that, “multinational 
liability under the “agency” concept is most 
often an entirely unpromising remedy” (Blum-
berg, 2001).
4.2. Forum Non Conveniens
Forum Non Conveniens (FNC) is a common law 
doctrine under which courts may decline to 
exercise jurisdiction over an action on the basis 
that the balance of relevant interests is in favor 
of the trial being conducted in a foreign forum 
(Rothluebber v. Obee, 2003)11. At its “broad 
discretion” (Peregrine Myanmar Ltd. v. Segal, 
1996, p. 46) courts may, dismiss a case despite 
having the requisite subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction, where another forum is available 
and more appropriate (Blumberg, 2002, p. 501). 
Forum Non Conveniens is not considered ex oficio 
by judges, it only arises on the defendant’s 
application (Joseph, 2004, p. 87).
a) The elements of the Forum Non Conveniens Test
As established by the two American landmark 
decisions on Forum Non Conveniens, Gulf Oil Corp. 
v. Gilbert (1947) and Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno 
(1981), two-step test needs to be used to deter-
mine if Forum Non Conveniens is applicable or not. 
The first step is to examine the availability of a 
more adequate alternative forum to adjudicate 
the dispute. Secondly, if an adequate alternative 
forum exists, the court will then balance the pu-
blic and private interests to determine whether 
the convenience of the parties and the goals of 
justice would best be served by dismissing the 
action in favor of the alternative forum (Fellas, 
2008, p. 326)12. 
11 See also: Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (United States 
Supreme Court 10 of March of 1947); Semanishin v. Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co., 46 N.J. 531 (Supreme Court of New Jersey 4 of April 
of 1966); Plum v. Tampax, Inc., 402 Pa. 616 (Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania 30 of January of 1961); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 
454 US 235 (United States Supreme Court 08 of December of 
1981); Joseph (2004, p. 87).
12 See also Joseph (2004, p. 88) and Blumberg (2002, p. 505).  
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i) Existence of an adequate alternative forum 
Under the adequacy criteria, the Court has to 
assess whether an alternative more adequate 
forum is available to provide effective relief to 
the plaintiff. In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno (1981), 
the US Supreme Court held that “while domestic 
plaintiffs should be afforded ‘substantial defe-
rence’ in their choice of forum, courts should be 
‘less solicitous’ in the case of foreign plaintiffs 
seeking to benefit from the more liberal tort 
rules provided for the protection of Americans” 
(Blumberg, 2002, p. 505). 
In Sarei v. Rio Tinto the Court chose to strictly 
apply the test by arguing that Australia, the 
home country of one of the defendants, was 
not an adequate forum because the exact ATCA 
claims were not recognized under Australian law, 
notwithstanding the fact that the claims were 
actionable under domestic tort law (Sarei v. Rio 
Tinto, 2002). 
In Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 
the Court found that Canada was an adequate 
forum even though it did not permit ATCA like 
claims. The decision was justified on the ground 
that the plaintiffs did not challenge Canada’s 
adequacy as a forum, although the court also 
mentioned that if Canada’s adequacy would have 
been contested, the outcome would have been 
different (Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Ta-
lisman Energy, 2003). From this holding we may 
conclude, tribunals seem to give more impor-
tance to formal rather than substantive issues 
when it comes to determining its jurisdiction 
under the Forum Non Conveniens doctrine. In so 
doing, the legal system is depraved of coherent 
and continuous interpretation and application 
of this issue. 
In applying the aforementioned criteria to deter-
mine the adequacy or inadequacy of a forum13, 
13  See John Fellas “There are three different bases for claiming that 
a forum is inadequate: (a) the substantive law of the alternative 
forum is inadequate; (b) the procedures of the alternative forum 
difficulty arises where a case is considerably 
fact-intensive and is an issue that is further 
compounded by the discretionary nature of the 
judicial decision-making in these cases. 
The lack of uniformity in applying the doctrine 
has motivated many countries, specially deve-
loping ones, to issue legislation that permits 
victims to refrain from exercising jurisdiction in 
domestic courts when the case has been taken 
before a foreign tribunal14. The sole purpose of 
such measures is to prevent defendants from 
having a case dismissed in an American court 
that is brought by a citizen of the same nation 
as the defendant15.
ii) Balancing private and public interests
Since Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, the private interest of the 
litigant is considered to be the most pressing 
criteria when it comes to balancing public and 
private interests. The court held that:
Important considerations are the relative 
ease of access to sources of proof; availa-
bility of compulsory process for attendance 
of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining at-
tendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of 
view of premises, if view would be appro-
priate to the action; and all other practical 
problems that make trial of a case easy, 
expeditious and inexpensive. There may 
also be questions as to the enforceability of 
a judgment if one is obtained. The court will 
weigh relative advantages and obstacles to 
fair trial. (…) But unless the balance is stron-
are inadequate; or (c) the political or social circumstances in the 
alternative forum are such as to render it inadequate” (Fellas, 
2008, p. 330-335). 
14 The practice of issuing legislation to counteract the effects 
of FNC in foreign courts, was developed in the late 1990’s by 
civil law countries -mainly Latin Americans- and is known as 
‘retaliatory legislation’.
15 See Diario de Centro América. (1997, 12 of June). Decreto 34 
de 1997 de Guatemala Articulo 2, Tomo CCLVI, Numero 69: 
“La acción personal que un autor nacional radica validamente 
en el extranjero ante juez que es competente, hace fenecer la 
competencia nacional (…)”. (Non official translation made by 
the author: The personal action that a national submits abroad 
before a competent judge terminates the domestic jurisdiction 
(…)). 
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gly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s 
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed 
(Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 1947, p. 508).
In considering the criterion of private interests, 
the courts are trying to guarantee due process 
as well as general procedural principles such as 
celerity and economy of the process whilst also 
ensuring that the judge has direct contact with 
the elements of the case, including its proofs. 
There is nothing wrong in that protective analysis 
when it comes to cases that involve human right 
violations committed by corporations, except 
that the analysis cannot overlook the fact that 
the two parties to the process are never equal 
in their means and possibilities. Therefore the 
judicial reasoning should necessarily consider 
the existent inequalities between the normally 
wealthy and powerful corporation and the hu-
man rights victims16. Consequently, the judge 
should aim, through their decision-making, 
to balance the standing of the two parties by 
favoring the interest of the victims above the 
corporation’s private interests.
Further to this, both Gulf Oil v. Gilbert (1947) and 
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno (1981) also presented 
public interest as something that needs to be 
taken into account by the judge:
Administrative difficulties follow for courts 
when litigation is piled up in congested cen-
ters instead of being handled at its origin. 
Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be 
imposed upon the people of a community 
that have no connection to the litigation. 
In cases that affect many people, there is 
reason for holding the trial in their view 
and reach rather than in remote parts of 
the country where they may only learn of 
it through the media. There is a commu-
nity interest in having local controversies 
decided at home. Furthermore, there is an 
appropriateness, too, in having the trial of 
a diversity case in a forum that is at home 
16  There could be an exception in the cases that involve a strong 
union as a counterpart of the corporation. Anyway some criteria 
to determine how different the situations of the parties of the 
process are should be developed by the jurisprudence.
with the state law that must govern the 
case, rather than having a court in some 
other forum untangle problems in conflict 
of laws, and in law foreign to itself (Gulf Oil 
v. Gilbert, 1947, p. 509).
Although the value given by tribunals to each of 
the Forum Non Conveniens elements is still subject 
to dispute, it has been considered that if the 
availability of an adequate alternative forum 
has been determined and the private interest 
considerations strongly favor dismissal, there is 
no need to consider the public interest factors17. 
The public interest therefore acts as a secondary 
factor, to be considered only “if the trial judge 
finds the balanced private interests to be in 
equipoise or near equipoise” (Gulf Oil Corp. v. 
Gilbert, 1947, p. 509).
The latest tendency, as laid out in Presbyterian 
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy (2003) and 
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (2000), is to 
use the private interest consideration in favor 
of ensuring litigation against TNCs. This case 
exemplifies a jurisprudential change towards 
what was suggested in the ‘private interest’ 
discussion above, the recognition by tribunals 
that an enormous imbalance of resources exist 
in favor of the defendant (the corporation), ma-
king the inconvenience of a process in a different 
forum affordable to them. 
b) Forum Non Conveniens and TNC’s responsibility for human 
rights violations: the threshold imposed by ATCA and TVPA 
in the US. 
Since the celebrated 1986 case of In re Union Car-
bide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal (1986)18 Forum 
17 See Empresas Lineas Maritimas v. Schichau-Unterweiser, 955 
F.2d 368 (United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit 12 of 
March of 1992); Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324 (Unit-
ed States District Courts, S.D., Texas, Houston Division 11 of July 
of 1995); Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165 (United States 
Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit 16 of November of 2000); Kully 
v. Aircraft Service Int’l Group, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 2d 259 (United 
States District Court E.D. New York 10 of August of 2009). 
18 In the Bhopal (1986) case, the US District Court for the Southern 
District of New York considered that “(…) all of the private inter-
est factors described in Piper and Gilbert weigh heavily toward 
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Non Conveniens has been pleaded by TNCs in vir-
tually all human rights cases involving violations 
committed by multinational parent corporations 
abroad that resulted in injuries of foreign wor-
kers, consumers, or residents (Blumberg, 2002, 
p. 502). “It presents a further formidable obstacle 
to litigation seeking an American adjudication 
of allegedly wrongful conduct abroad injuring 
foreign plaintiffs, whether brought against the 
American multinational parent corporation, or 
one of its foreign subsidiaries” (Blumberg, 2001).
As it was signal by the SRSG in his 2008 Report 
to the Human Rights Council, it should be a 
matter of concern that Forum Non Conveniens is 
such a recurrent tool used to dismiss ‘corporate-
human rights’ cases in common law countries. 
Many governments argue for dismissal on the 
grounds of “matters of State”, may influence 
even the most independent judiciaries. As a 
result victims will be deterred from their claims 
and furthermore will face the perceived impossi-
bility of enforcing the remedies they are entitled 
to (Ruggie, 2008, p. 9).
In the US, a change in the justiciability of hu-
man rights cases is being pushed by ATCA and 
TVPA. This tendency logically originates from 
case law, as Forum Non Conveniens and ATCA are 
in contradiction with each other. On one hand, 
the ATCA is a “statute that opens U.S. courts 
dismissal of this case on the grounds of forum non conveniens.” 
(In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 
634 F. Supp. 842, 844 (United States District Court Southern 
District of New York 12 of May of 1986)) at p. 686 – 687.
“The public interest factors set forth in Piper and Gilbert also favor 
dismissal. (…) The cost to American taxpayers of supporting 
the litigation in the United States would be excessive. When 
another, adequate and more convenient forum so clearly exists, 
there is no reason to press the United States judiciary to the 
limits of its capacity” (at p. 867). 
“(…) In the Court’s view, to retain the litigation in this forum, as 
plaintiffs request, would be yet another example of imperial-
ism, (…) To deprive the Indian judiciary of this opportunity to 
stand tall before the world and to pass judgment on behalf of 
its own people would be to revive a history of subservience and 
subjugation from which India has emerged. India and its people 
can and must vindicate their claims before the independent 
and legitimate judiciary created there since the Independence 
of 1947.” (at p. 867).
to suits by alien plaintiffs who have suffered 
human rights violations abroad”, in an example 
of what can be consider as an exercise of uni-
versal jurisdiction (Baldwin, 2007). On the other 
hand Forum Non Conveniens is a doctrine that 
“operates to shut the door to U.S. courts when 
the plaintiffs are aliens and the violations have 
occurred overseas” (Baldwin, 2007). The conflict 
between the two mechanisms has produced a 
slow evolution towards stronger judicial means 
for making parent corporations more respon-
sible under ATCA, even by pushing the change 
as far as to affect Non-ATCA plaintiffs as was 
the case in Martinez v. Dow Chem. Co. (2002)19.
United States Courts are increasingly more 
prone to accept arguments that demonstrate 
that the alternative forum proposed by the 
defendants is inadequate, accepting for that 
purpose non-traditional sources, such as State 
Department Reports that demonstrate high co-
rruption levels in the forum, to be submitted as 
evidence. Decisions such as Wiwa v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum (2000)20;  Iragorri v. Int’l Elevator Inc. 
19 In this case, workers claimed to have been exposed to and 
rendered sterile by a chemical produced by the chemical com-
panies and used by the growers on banana farms in Costa Rica, 
Honduras, and the Philippines. The court concluded that none 
of the three States were available as an alternative forum for 
the worker’s claims. Therefore, The court denied defendant’s 
motions to dismiss for forum non conveniens. This decision has 
been criticized by:  Realuyo v. Villa Abrille, 32 Media L. 
Rep. (BNA) 1427 (United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York 08 of July of 2003) at ¶ 38; Morales v. Ford 
Motor Co., 313 F.Supp.2d 672 (United States District Court, S.D. 
Texas, Brownsville Division 31 of March of 2004) at ¶ 676. And 
followed by: Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp, 523 F.3d 602 (Unit-
ed States Courts of Appeals Fifth Circuit 07 of April of 2008) at 
¶ 607; Fernando Ramirez Sainz, Peticionario v. Alexander Cabanillas, 
Fulana de Tal y la Sociedad Legal de Gananciales compuesta por ambos, 
Peticionarias, 2009 TSPR 151 (Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico 
06 de octubre de 2009) at ¶ 41. 
20 In September 25 1998, following the Report of Magistrate Judge 
Henry Pitman, Judge Wood from the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York dismissed this case on the basis 
of forum non convenines, as it was considered that England 
was an “adequate alternative forum”. The case was appealed by 
the plaintiffs before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Districts, which decided on September 14 2000 to reverse the 
dismissal based on forum non conveniens.and remanded the 
case for further proceedings. Shell moved for certiorari before 
the US Supreme Court, but the petition was rejected in March 26 
2001. Finally, the case was settled through an agreement on the 
eve of trial on June 8 2009, according to which Shell committed 
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(2001),  Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. (2002);  Bigio v. 
Coca-Cola Co. (2006);  Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l 
Bank Ltd. (2007); and Arar v. Ashcroft (2008), 
“decreases the chance of an [Forum Non Conve-
niens] dismissal in torture cases, and might even 
be used to deflect [Forum Non Conveniens] argu-
ments in all ATCA cases”  (Joseph, 2004, p. 99).
A change has began in the American culture, 
although in such a heterogeneous and cum-
bersome fashion that it makes it difficult to 
predict how a case involving a corporate hu-
man right violation is going to be decided by a 
court, diminishing both the juridical certainty 
and encouragement that victims may have to 
vindicate their rights.
Probably acknowledging that heterogeneous 
cultural change, on 17 October 2011 the US 
Supreme Court decided to grant writ of certio-
rari to the Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 
(2010) case21.  The case was brought by Nigerian 
plaintiffs (Esther Kiobel, the wife of Dr. Barinem 
Kiobel- an Ogoni activist who campaigned 
against the environmental damage caused by 
oil extraction in the Ogoni region of Nigeria) 
against Shell, alleging that the company aided 
and abetted the Nigerian military dictatorship 
in the 1990s in the commission of gross human 
rights violations, including torture, extra-judicial 
execution, and crimes against humanity (Center, 
Business and Human Rights, 2009)22.  
The Kiobel case is the first time an ATCA case 
on corporate responsibility is reviewed by the 
Supreme Court, giving the opportunity to ‘crys-
tallize’ uniform criteria on most of the issues 
to pay US $15.5 Millions as compensation. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co. v. Wiwa, 532 U.S. 941 (United States Supreme Court, 26 of 
March of 2001). 
21 Certiorari was granted in October 2011 (80 U.S.L.W. 3237 (United 
States Supreme Court 17 of October of 2011)). After a long period 
of amicus curie submissions, the case is pending for decision.
22  See also Ruggie, J. (2012, 4 of September). Kiobel and Corporate 
Social Responsibility. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Har-
vard University. Available at http://www.business-humanrights.
org/media/documents/ruggie-kiobel-and-corp-social-resonsi-
bility-sep-2012.pdf 
addressed in this section. The Court will rehear 
the case on 1 October 2012 and in the meanti-
me requested the parties to “submit briefs on 
whether the ATCA allows federal courts to hear 
lawsuits alleging violations to the law of nations 
that occur outside the US”  (Center, Business 
and Human Rights, 2009, 25 of September).
 
In other jurisdictions, the application of the Fo-
rum Non Conveniens doctrine in cases that involve 
human rights violations by corporations share 
the same difficulties showed by American juris-
prudence. In countries like the United Kingdom, 
many cases have been submitted against parent 
corporations and in all of them forum Non Conve-
niens has been present as part of the exceptions 
alleged by the defendants. It was only until the 
Andrew Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, trading as ‘Villa 
Holidays Bal-Inn Villas’ and Others, (2005) case, 
that the European Court of Justice decided that 
… application of the doctrine forum 
non conveniens is liable to undermine the 
predictability of the rules of jurisdiction 
(…) and consequently to undermine the 
principle of legal certainty (…). Moreover, 
allowing forum non conveniens would be 
likely to affect the uniform application 
of the rules of jurisdiction contained in 
the Convention and the legal protection 
of persons established in the Community  
(Andrew Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, trading 
as ‘Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas’ and 
Others, 2005, p. 41 – 46). 
This decision has made hundreds of litigation 
suits possible against corporations established 
in the European Union. 
On the other hand, many states have seen the 
Owusu case as a decision against their legal 
procedural system, as it has been the case of 
the UK:
The United Kingdom regrets the inflexi-
bility inherent in the [European Court of 
Justice’s] decision in Owusu v. Jackson. It has 
to a great extent disabled our valuable 
115
Is an InternatIonal Corporate Human rIgHts lIabIlIty framework needed? an eConomIC power, busIness and Human rIgHts...
Opinión Jurídica, Vol. 12, N° 24, pp. 101-118 - ISSN 1692-2530 • Julio-Diciembre de 2013 / 200 p. Medellín, Colombia
procedural mechanism of forum non con-
veniens which facilitates the transfer of 
cases which would be more appropria-
tely dealt with by the courts in another 
jurisdiction (…).
There is a clear need for a broader trans-
fer rule which would also be apt to cover 
situations of the kind which arose on the 
facts of Owusu (United Kingdom Ministry 
of Justice, 2009, 3 of September).
An international approach has been taken in 
proposing a uniform standard for the appli-
cation of the forum non conveniens doctrine in 
international litigations. However, the approach 
given by the 1999 Preliminary draft convention 
on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments (Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, 2012, 5 
of September) did not consider a human rights 
perspective, although it is recognizable that 
the work done by the Special Commission of 
the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law laid the foundations for the construction 
of an international forum non conveniens standard.
The purpose of this article is not to propose 
the elimination of forum non conveniens, but to 
encourage the equipment of judges with the 
appropriate tools to allow them to apply it in 
a more consistent way, recognizing the unba-
lance that normally exists between defendants 
and plaintiffs. Parent corporations cannot use 
forum non conveniens as a means to avoiding their 
responsibility for human rights violations or for 
the violations committed by its subsidiaries. 
A possible solution to the problem of forum non 
conveniens, could have been the inclusion of cri-
teria for the applicability of forum non conveniens 
in human rights litigation against corporations, 
in the Guiding Principles for Business and Hu-
man Rights submitted in 2011 by the SRSG and 
unanimously approved by the UN Human Rights 
Council (Ruggie, 2011)23.  
23 Regarding the endorsement made be the Human Rights Council 
to the Principles, see, Human Rights Council, United Nations 
Conversely, anyone could argue that the guiding 
principles were supposed to be general and 
not specific enough to have set criteria on the 
matter. Although recognizing the generality of 
principles, a general norm guiding extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction, including the forum non conveniens 
doctrine in it, could have been developed and 
complemented by a commentary addendum to 
it that includes a detailed criteria.
After the SRSG finished his mandate with the 
presentation of the Guiding Principles, a five 
independent experts working group was appoin-
ted, with a wide three-years mandate that focus, 
among other things, in continuing exploring 
options and making recommendations at the 
national, regional and international levels for 
enhancing access to effective remedies availa-
ble to those whose human rights are affected 
by corporate activities (Human Rights Council, 
2011, 16 of June). Probably it will be under this 
Working Group’s mandate that we will finally 
achieve a clarification on the forum non conveniens 
issue, contributing to the restoration of victims’ 
human rights.
5. Conclusion
As a result of globalization, many corporations 
have gained significant economic power which 
often puts them in a stronger position to ne-
gotiate against weaker states whose political 
power is subjugated by economic powering 
today’s world. The complexity of multi-national 
and multi-layer corporate structures hinders 
the potential reach of justice to reach as far 
as needed to achieve its goal.  Moreover, the 
inexistence of proper uniform procedural me-
chanisms to allow human rights victims’ access 
to justice constitutes an obstacle to their fight 
for obtaining adequate reparation. 
(2011, 16 of June), Human Rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises, Geneva: United Nations Human 
Rights Council.
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The fact that TNCs represent one of the most 
relevant participants in the international sphere 
is unquestionable. Corporations, as an active 
participant of an international community that 
has recognized human rights as a cornerstone of 
its international legal system, have the obligation 
to respect human rights and be held responsible 
when they fail in doing so. In the words of Irene 
Khan, Secretary-General of Amnesty Interna-
tional, “human rights are rooted in law. Res-
pecting and protecting them was never meant 
to be an optional extra, a matter of choice. It is 
expected and required. It should be part of the 
mainstream of any company’s strategy, not only 
seen as part of its corporate social responsibility 
strategy” (Khan, 2005, 2 of June).
If the goal of corporations is to obtain revenues, 
then governments need to find mechanisms 
that will enforce them in following international 
human right standards, rather than violating 
them. A first step towards that goal is without a 
doubt the creation of a corporate responsibility 
framework that is logical, fair and clear enough 
to be feasibly adopted and enforced, as well 
as to act as a deterrent against human rights 
violations.
The Guiding Principles on Business and Hu-
man Rights were submitted by the SRSG and 
endorsed by the Human Rights Council in 2011. 
Taking into account the acceptance the SRSG’s 
work has had among the different international 
stakeholders, it is imaginable the strong value 
that these principles are going to have, even as 
the soft law instrument they are. 
It is expected that the consequence of the di-
fferent circumstances explained throughout this 
article, motivate the creation of an international 
framework for corporate responsibility of human 
rights violations.
Regarding the legal development of the ATCA 
in the US, and the way it will continue having 
an impact in corporate responsibility and hu-
man rights victims’ access to justice; we face a 
precious opportunity with the decision of the 
US Supreme Court to review the appeal denied 
by the US Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (2010) case. 
It is the first time that the US highest Court re-
views the issue of corporate responsibility under 
ATCA. The consequences, for better or worse, 
will be the unification of standards on corporate 
responsibility, a field that until the day has been 
very heterogeneous. 
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